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Sustaining Neighborhoods of Choice: From Land 
Bank(ing) to Land Trust(ing) 
James J. Kelly, Jr.* 
In looking back over the first decade of this new century, one cannot help 
but see that housing has been treated more like a consumption good than as a 
form of wealth.  Until the bubble burst in 2007, “house lust” drove both con-
sumer and lender behavior in homeownership finance.  As we look to the future 
of housing within the framework of equity, stability, and sustainability, we 
would do well to return to community membership as a central aspect of hous-
ing.  When we buy (or rent) a home, we are not only satisfying needs and wants 
related to shelter but also buying into an array of locally provided public goods.  
Because many of these goods, foremost among them primary education, are 
essential to personal development, one cannot think of a fair, stable, or sustain-
able future for housing without considering the neighborhood as the community 
in which the act of acquiring a home purchases membership. 
In most places in the United States, a parent or couple’s choice of neigh-
borhood determines where their children will attend public school.  For low-
income households, little or no choice exists.  As shown by a study, increases 
in residential socioeconomic segregation negatively impact the educational at-
tainment of lower-income children, even though expansions in overall inequal-
ity do not.1  Fairness in basic education requires us to examine the need for and 
barriers to greater residential integration of different races and classes.  Atten-
tion to stability and sustainability reminds us to focus on the role of real estate 
markets in creating or destroying, encouraging or hindering residential socio-
economic integration. 
This essay will explore how land banks and land trusts promote social 
goods, including socioeconomic integration, by connecting with and shielding 
against, respectively, market forces.  Both engage in stewardship of land.  Land 
banks take temporary ownership of vacant, abandoned properties in order to 
make them available for productive use.2  Land trusts hold land indefinitely to 
ensure a social purpose is met.  Community land trusts hold land for a purpose 
 
 *  Clinical Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School.  I would like to thank the organizers of and my 
fellow presenters at the 2015 Washburn Law Journal symposium on The Future of Housing—Equity, Stability 
and Sustainability for their inspiring contributions on this vitally important subject. 
 1. Susan Mayer, How Economic Segregation Affects Children’s Educational Attainment, 81 SOC. 
FORCES 153 (2002). 
 2. Frank S. Alexander, Land Banks and Land Banking, CTR. FOR CMTY. PROGRESS (2nd ed. 2015). 
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that is responsive to the human environment, often permanently affordable 
housing in areas where affordable housing is rare to nonexistent.3  Land banks 
encourage people with choices to move into neighborhoods beset by abandon-
ment and poverty.  Community land trusts allow lower-income residents to be-
come long-term members of neighborhoods otherwise inaccessible to them.  
Land banks reduce transaction costs to get the market moving.  Land trusts in-
crease transaction costs in order to protect affordable housing and other public 
goods against elimination by market-driven transfers. 
The use by these two publicly minded real estate market interventions of 
opposing tools in starkly different types of neighborhoods raises the following 
questions: First, do they meet somewhere in the middle? Second, does sustain-
ing neighborhoods of choice hinge on the handoff of some critical mass of real 
property from land banks to land trusts?  The answers to these both questions 
are negative, if we focus our attention solely on the work done directly by land 
banks and land trusts.  The neighborhoods that warrant the housing stewardship 
activity of land trusts are just too different from those needing the help of land 
banks to talk of a continuum of care between the two poles of community land 
resource control.  But, if land banking and its conceptual counterpart, “land 
trusting”, are thought of more broadly as the strategic adjustment of transaction 
costs for the promotion of social goods, such as residential socioeconomic in-
tegration, then an array of intermediate possibilities present themselves. 
This essay will begin with a brief examination of the importance of resi-
dential socioeconomic integration and how it might be advanced appropriately.  
After looking at some misconceptions about the market’s role in segregating 
neighborhoods by class, I then explore how land banks and land trusts intervene 
to move neighborhoods toward a healthy diversity.  The essay concludes with 
a discussion of land banking and, particularly, land trusting as alternatives to 
formal stewardship that nevertheless also foster the needed diversity of housing 
types, land tenure types, and ultimately, resident socioeconomic status to sus-
tain neighborhoods of choice. 
Although a full defense of a residential socioeconomic integration as a 
social goal is beyond the scope of this essay, a brief look at the justification for 
class diversity can help us understand what we are seeking as well as why.  
Calls for economic equality are frequently met with concerns about excessive 
taxation, moral hazard, and government interference with a range of civil liber-
ties.4  These objections have some validity when the nature of equity being 
advocated requires strict equivalencies in a broad range of basic consumption 
goods.  But, as the economist and social philosopher Amartya Sen frames it, 
everyone believes in some basic form of fairness among people, so the key 
 
 3. James J. Kelly, Jr., Land Trusts that Conserve Communities, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 69, 79–83 (2009). 
 4. See, e.g., John H. Cochrane, What the Inequality Warriors Really Want, WALL ST. J., (Nov. 20, 2014) 
available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/john-h-cochrane-what-the-inequality-warriors-really-want-
1416442460. 
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question is “Equality of what?”5  A libertarian’s idea of economic equality 
amounts to equal access to unfettered markets, a good that need not be rationed 
because it need not be limited.  Sen’s own answer is also framed around equal-
ity of opportunity—but of substantive, meaningful opportunities, not merely 
theoretical ones made appealing by a rags-to-riches mythology.  A true oppor-
tunity society is one that is rigorously inclusive when it comes to developmen-
tally essential goods. 
As important as primary education is to personal development and eco-
nomic opportunity, it is not at all clear that equality in basic education requires 
neighborhoods to be integrated socioeconomically.  Elementary school student 
populations need not be integrated across class to be equal in their resources.  
For decades, advocates of educational equality have fought for school funding 
reforms that would even out differences among local school district budgets.6  
While parity in resources is absolutely essential for any intelligible claim of 
equality in educational opportunity, a “separate but equal” approach to the 
schooling of children from different socioeconomic groups fails for many of 
the same reasons that it did when used to justify racially segregated schools.7 
Even once the need for residential socioeconomic integration is accepted, 
questions still remain about the extent of the integration or, better still, the po-
tential for voluntary integration required to address the serious justice concerns 
raised by segregation.  The fundamental problem is that poor households do not 
have the option of relocating in areas with good schools.  Forced integration 
would replace one way of depriving them of housing autonomy with its oppo-
site.  The goal then should be to ensure that every household in a given metro-
politan area has the opportunity to live in any school district in that metropolitan 
area.  As housing costs make up such a large part of the typical household 
budget, it might seem, at first, that a call to equality in neighborhood choice 
would be tantamount to a demand for total economic equality.  But, the decision 
to live in a more exclusive area need not be completely without cost. 
To have educational choice means that there is some possibility of gaining 
access to the desired school without having to live in a grossly overcrowded or 
substandard dwelling.  But, a strict insistence of equal access to public goods 
does not entail no variation whatsoever in the quality of public goods, much 
less that every community must be as diverse as the metropolitan area as a 
whole.8  Two communities with very similar tax bases may value education 
 
 5. Amartya Sen, Equality of What?, in CHOICE, WELFARE AND MEASUREMENT 353 (MIT Press 1982). 
 6. See e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971). 
 7. See Brown v. Bd. of Ed. of Topeka, 387 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 8. Peter Byrne and Michael Diamond have rightly criticized as a “strawman” Robert Ellickson’s hypo-
thetical “Waring Blender” model of neighborhood social composition in which every neighborhood would be 
engineered to be precisely reflective of the social composition of the general population as a whole.  J. Peter 
Byrne & Michael Diamond, Affordable Housing, Land Tenure, and Urban Policy: The Matrix Revealed, 34 
FORDHAM URB. L. J. 527, 564 (2007) (citing Robert C. Ellickson, The Puzzle of the Optimal Social Composition 
of Neighborhoods, in THE TIEBOUT MODEL AT FIFTY: ESSAYS IN PUBLIC ECONOMICS IN HONOR OF WALLACE 
OATES 199, 201 (William A. Fischel ed., 2006)). 
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differently.  One group of citizens may tax themselves more to have better 
schools or sacrifice other less essential public goods or amenities.9  Lower-
income households that want access to those goods may have to accept lesser 
housing.  The key to making choice as much a reality for the poor as the wealthy 
is to ensure a range of housing options in each community. 
If one were to estimate that a typical elementary school of five hundred 
students draws from a surrounding community of 5000 persons, it would seem 
sufficient that every geographic area containing 5000, roughly the population 
of the typical census tract, has enough diversity in its housing options to offer 
housing options to every low- and moderate-income households in the area.  
This very strict approach to integration would facilitate socioeconomic diver-
sity not just in every school district but within every elementary school catch-
ment area.  The incorporation of education reforms already under consideration 
may allow for a less constrained geographic approach.  True parity in resources 
among school districts would make it less essential that every school district 
have housing options that allow for a critical mass of the poorest families in the 
metropolitan area.10  With provisions allowing low-income children in a school 
district to attend an elementary school other than the one closest to them, one 
could easily imagine affordable housing “fair share” to mean the full range of 
housing affordability in each and every community of 15,000 or even of 25,000, 
instead of 5000. 
Admittedly, the full ramifications of such integration cannot be known 
without an in-depth exploration of the means of achieving its costs and unin-
tended consequences.  The point of this brief sketch of the argument is two-
fold: to show that any notice of equality of true opportunity mandates the true 
sharing of developmentally essential goods such as primary education; and, to 
articulate what level of residential class integration is needed to allow true 
school choice.  A full review is beyond the scope of this essay.  Nevertheless, 
some unintended consequences of freeing lower-income households to seek 
better school districts should be considered here precisely because they impact 
the overall goal of enhancing the development potential of low-income fami-
lies. 
Even if the driving force of the moral argument is ensuring equal access 
to primary education as a developmentally essential local public good rather 
than total welfare maximization more generally, any advocate of mobility strat-
egies to end residential socioeconomic segregation must be aware of unin-
 
 9. Charles Tiebout saw this potential for sorting of metropolitan residents based on their public goods 
and taxation preferences as a fundamental efficiency of decentralized provision of public goods by local gov-
ernment.  Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956). 
 10. The NAACP strategy to overturn Plessy v. Ferguson, 16 S. Ct. 1138 (1896), in the context of public 
school education brought about belated efforts by segregationist systems to make the schools for African-
American children as well-provided for as those for white children.  Similarly, an attack on socioeconomic 
segregation of schools may well increase the political necessity for equalization of resources. 
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tended consequences that harm lower-income persons who do not move.  In-
creasing the choice of ambitious, capable marginalized people will aggravate 
overconcentration of poverty.  William Julius Wilson has documented that 
more attractive neighborhood options for both working class and professional 
class African-Americans aggravated the social isolation of very low-income 
African-Americans remaining behind.11  Low-income residents loyal to their 
current neighborhoods should not themselves be forced to leave their commu-
nities by the loss of the little class diversity there was.  Mobility strategies de-
signed to open up the suburbs must be complemented by place-based commu-
nity development that will stabilize impoverished neighborhoods.12 
As discussed below, turning distressed areas into neighborhoods of choice 
involves reconnecting vacant and underused properties to the market.  Once 
that economic improvement begins to take hold, another relevant unintended 
consequence may present problems for those who wish to remain.  Gentrifica-
tion can lead to displacement, especially for renters.  Just as those who wish to 
remain should not see their streets and schools become even more intolerable 
because their neighbors with decently paying jobs and kids have more options, 
far less should they face eviction from their community after working so hard 
to rebuild it. 
The move towards ideal socioeconomic residential integration, then, in-
volves three strategic elements.  First, residential enclaves of the well-to-do 
must be diminished both in geographic extent and degree of exclusivity by the 
strategic siting of long-term affordable housing.  Second, undercrowded, pov-
erty-stricken neighborhoods must be reconnected to functioning real estate 
markets and developed as attractive options for households that already have 
the ability to choose among different stable neighborhoods.  Third, as neigh-
borhoods gentrify, renters and homeowners must not be forced out of their 
homes and certainly not out of their communities. 
For each of these three strategies, financial subsidies to consumers and 
suppliers of housing are indispensable.13  But, to think that subsidies are the 
only mechanism involved in ending residential segregation by class is to buy 
into the myth that markets naturally segregate the various classes into separate 
 
 11. See generally WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE 
UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1987). 
 12. Nestor M. Davidson, Reconciling People and Place in Housing and Community Development, 16 
GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 1, 6–9 (2009). 
 13. Neither should it be thought that a truly unfettered market will achieve anything like the diversity of 
housing opportunities to allow a low-income family to reside in any school district within commuting distance 
of their jobs.  In the suburbs, we need fixed-location as well as portable housing subsidies.  Fixed-location 
subsidy retention will require that subsidized homeowners be subjected to resale restrictions. James J. Kelly, 
Jr., Homes Affordable for Good: Covenants and Ground Leases as Long-Term Resale-Restriction Devices, 29 
ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 9, 19–23 (2009) [hereinafter Homes Affordable for Good].  In undercrowded inner-
city neighborhoods, subsidies will be needed to help create units whose market values do not cover the con-
struction/rehab costs.  The need for large public financial investment in residential socioeconomic desegrega-
tion is just one of several reasons why no discussion of the policy arguments for it is complete without looking 
more broadly at its costs, unintended consequences, and importance to other social and political imperatives. 
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parts of the metropolitan area.  Admittedly, the idea has intuitive appeal, at least 
superficially.  When families eat out, wealthier households choose more expen-
sive restaurants than lower-income families choose.  Restaurants, to a signifi-
cant extent, segregate us by class, the thinking might go, so we should not be 
surprised when neighborhoods do the same.  The reality, however, is that nei-
ther the uniform affluence of many suburban subdivisions nor the entrenched 
physical degradation of distressed inner-city neighborhoods is a natural dictate 
of market forces. After describing how the market is prevented from increasing 
integration in neighborhoods, I will explain how land trusts and land banks re-
spectively work to promote the socioeconomic integration described in the first 
two strategic objectives.  An exploration of how “land trusting” can help further 
the third goal will follow a discussion of my reasons for being skeptical of the 
benefits of an institutional continuum that connects land banks to land trusts. 
Local governments not only set local property tax rates but also establish 
zoning rules that dictate the basic types of houses that will be taxed.  By zoning 
out small lots and multi-family housing, suburbs protect against overcrowding 
of their schools and establish a minimum buy-in price for community member-
ship.  Thus, local residents are able not only to choose the level of public goods 
they desire but also to ensure that their fellow local voters have roughly the 
same income as they do.14  This “fiscal zoning” is the primary method by which 
suburban governments prevent the market from fostering greater socioeco-
nomic diversity and causing their locally funded public goods to be shared 
across a wider class spectrum.  Even from the inception of zoning nearly a cen-
tury ago, the power to segregate apartment buildings from single-family houses 
was justified as a way of making sure that residents of the former did not free 
ride on the amenities enjoyed by the latter.15  Together with racially discrimi-
natory disbursement of subsidies for suburban development and the unavaila-
bility of inter-district school desegregation remedies,16 fiscal zoning has given 
middle- and upper-income urban residents the ability to set up tailor-made en-
claves.  At their core, inclusionary zoning and other state and regional responses 
to exclusionary local land use practices throttle back the ability of localities to 
interfere with the market’s natural propensity to create greater density in some 
parts of some suburban communities. 
At the other end of the spectrum, neighborhoods that suffer from disin-
vestment and abandonment seem to already have their answer from the market: 
 
 14. WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: HOW HOME VALUES INFLUENCE LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND-USE POLICIES 65–69 (2001) (citing Bruce W. Hamil-
ton, Zoning and Property Taxation in a System of Local Governments, 12 URB. STUD. 205 (1975)). 
 15. See Vill. of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 390 (1926) (referring to apartment 
buildings as parasites). 
 16. DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & SALLY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING 
OF THE UNDERCLASS 50–51 (1993) (discussing Federal Home Administration’s use of redlining maps and im-
position of racially restrictive covenants); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 752–53 (1974) (declining to 
enforce the school desegregation mandate against suburbs that had no history of de jure discrimination in edu-
cation). 
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“No” to any significant capital investment.  But, the assumption that no profit-
able deals can be done is only half-true.  It is undeniable that subsidies are 
needed to help rehabilitate the many houses that could not be resold at a price 
that would cover the costs of renovation.  But, the nature of public intervention 
must be in kind as well as in cash.  Undercrowded neighborhoods need to con-
front the impediments to market activity as well as look to favorable financing 
of rehabilitation and new construction. 
The market itself struggles to function in distressed neighborhoods, which 
have many properties with clouded titles and are impacted by other nearby va-
cant properties.  A deal that involves two parties with appropriate information 
assuring each of them of a profit to be had is a deal that is likely to be made, all 
other things being equal.  But, when a deal requires the coordination of many 
parties, some of whom may stand to gain little or nothing from giving their 
consent, the transaction costs involved may well thwart it even if it would pro-
duce an aggregate benefit.  Transaction costs can prevent even clearly efficient 
deals from occurring.  Even though the transaction costs hampering social ben-
eficial market activity in distressed neighborhoods are not deliberately erected 
in the way the exclusionary zoning restrictions are, both types of market inter-
ference require interventions to free properties to be developed in a way that 
promotes neighborhood class diversity. 
For more than thirty years, community land trusts (“CLT”) have built and 
sustained permanently affordable homes in areas where residential affordability 
was all too rare.  By separating the investment and consumption aspects of 
homeownership, CLTs allow members of lower-income households to become 
fully fledged members of an otherwise exclusive community.  CLT homeown-
ers can stay in their homes indefinitely17 and, with CLT consent, improve their 
properties.18  They can, like owners of market-purchased homes, even build up 
equity that can be converted to cash.19  But, CLT homebuyers promise not to 
rent out their homes.  They also covenant that, when it is time to move from the 
property, they will sell the home to another qualified household at an affordable 
price.20  These two restrictions on transfer insure that the subsidy that is so 
important to creating diversity in the neighborhood stays with the property and 
the qualified household.  Inclusionary zoning programs use similar restrictions 
 
 17. The CLT Technical Manual, NAT’L CMTY. LAND TRUST NETWORK (Kirby White, ed. 2011), availa-
ble at http://cltnetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/master-clt-manual.pdf. 
 18. Id. at 12-6 to 12-7. 
 19. John Emmeus Davis, Shared Equity Homeownership: The Changing Landscape of Resale-Restricted, 
Owner-Occupied Housing, at 102–06 (2006). 
 20. A community land trust (“CLT”) protects against full-price market sale of a CLT home principally 
through a preemptive option to purchase the property once the seller has declared the intent to transfer it.  The 
CLT Technical Manual, supra note 17, at 2-1 to 2-3.  The agreement between the CLT and the homebuyer 
includes a formula that determines what that resale price will be.  Id.  For a review of the possible enforceability 
relating to the property law doctrines of invalid restraints against alienability and perpetuities, see Michael F. 
Keeley & Peter B. Manzo, Resale Restrictions and Leverage Controls, A.B.A.  J. AFFORDABLE HOUS. & CMTY. 
DEV. L. 9 (Spring 1992); Homes Affordable for Good, supra note 15. 
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on sublease, assignment, and resale to sustain the socioeconomic diversity that 
program subsidies make possible.21 
Land trusts that focus on preserving affordable housing in unaffordable 
communities include not only CLTs but also agencies that monitor inclusionary 
housing, certain limited-equity cooperatives, some mutual housing associa-
tions, and nonprofit providers of affordable rental housing.  All of them recog-
nize that the in-kind benefit of decent, affordable housing they help provide to 
their beneficiary households can be converted to cash by the households 
through market transfers of possession.  As land trusts, they establish sufficient 
legal protections to inhibit these market transactions from taking place. 
Just as land trusts foster subsidy retention through increasing transaction 
costs, land banks reduce transaction costs to reconnect vacant properties with 
functioning real estate markets.  As the owners of vacant properties struggle 
financially, their titles frequently become a patchwork of mortgages as well as 
public and private liens.  A buyer wishing to acquire clear title to such a prop-
erty must negotiate not only with the owner but each and every one of the lien 
claimants.  There is rarely enough value in the property to induce every lien 
claimant and the record owner to release the property.  Even the possibility of 
a negotiated transfer presumes that the parties in title can all be properly iden-
tified and contacted.  The problem is multiplied when a buyer’s investment plan 
requires acquiring not just one vacant property but all the nearby vacants that 
suppress neighborhood property values.  The first task of a land bank, therefore, 
is to assemble clear title and repeat the process as often as necessary to allow 
for investment coordination.22 
Land banks typically overcome title clouds by acquiring properties 
through property tax sale foreclosures.  Nearly every state provides a foreclo-
sure remedy for collecting unpaid property taxes.23  Property tax liens take pri-
ority over not only the ownership interests, but also any private lien interests in 
the subject property, even if they predate the unmet tax liability.24  The super-
priority nature of the property tax lien makes property tax sale foreclosure an 
extremely powerful tool for clearing out various mortgages and other liens.  In-
stead of having to obtain the actual consent of all of the stakeholders, the fore-
closing land bank need only notify them of their rights to redeem their interests 
in the property by seeing to it that the outstanding tax debt is paid in full.25  By 
putting all the pieces of a fragmented title back together, the land bank as the 
property’s new owner can make it available for sale. 
 
 21. Homes Affordable for Good, supra note 15, at 37–38. 
 22. James J. Kelly, Jr., A Continuum In Remedies: Reconnecting Vacant Houses to the Market, 23 ST. 
LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 109, 128–31 (2013). 
 23. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 79-2801 (2007); MD. CODE ANN., TAX–PROP. § 14-834 (West 2008); 
GA. CODE ANN. § 48-3-3 (West 2007). 
 24. Frank S. Alexander, Tax Liens, Tax Sales, and Due Process, 75 IND. L. J. 747, 760 (2000). 
 25. Id.; James J. Kelly, Jr., Bringing Clarity to Title Clearing: Tax Foreclosure and Due Process in the 
Digital Age, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 63 (2008). 
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Acquiring all the tax-delinquent vacant properties within a block or two 
of one another allows land banks to market those properties in bundles.  Fre-
quently, dilapidated, tax-delinquent properties are located in neighborhoods 
where the land values are so low that even moderate repairs to the structure will 
exceed the resale price.  Such neighborhoods cannot support one-at-a-time va-
cant house rehabilitation.  If, however, a sufficiently capitalized renovator were 
to acquire all the vacant properties that affected one another, then the rehabili-
tation of all those houses might change the fundamental dynamic of that com-
munity.  Thus, land banks’ acquisition of tax-delinquent properties in key stra-
tegic neighborhoods can provided greatly needed investment coordination. 
Land banks frequently focus on the goal of helping a distressed neighbor-
hood compete for new residents, especially those in a position to choose from 
several different neighborhoods.  Long-time residents of these neighborhoods 
sometimes see the efforts to revitalize the community as an attempt to improve 
it for these new residents rather than for them.  As land banking efforts gain 
traction and the neighborhood gentrifies, these residents grow concerned that 
their rents or their property taxes will increase to the point that they will need 
to leave, even though they would prefer to stay.  As the CLT movement has 
looked to addressing the problems faced by neighborhoods in economically 
struggling cities, it has explored the question of what, if anything, resale-re-
stricted homeownership has to offer weak market communities. 
Developers of permanently affordable homes often confront high acquisi-
tion costs for land.  As one might expect, they and their advocates argue that it 
is never too early to start anticipating a lack of affordable housing.26  Urban 
areas that were once written off as beyond saving can suddenly become excit-
ing, attractive places for young people to live.  The unpredictability of inner-
city neighborhood markets, especially those receiving encouragement from 
land banking activities, supports the initiation of land trust activities before they 
appear needed.  Two inner-city land trusts illustrate how such a preventive ap-
proach might work. 
In the late 1980s, decades of disinvestment and arson had taken their toll 
on Boston’s Roxbury neighborhood.27  The activist founders of the Dudley 
Street Neighborhood Initiative (DSNI) resolved to respond to a redevelopment 
plan proposed by the Boston Redevelopment Authority with one written by the 
neighborhood residents themselves.28  Above all else, the leadership of DSNI 
wished to create a plan that did not involve resident displacement.29  Even 
though much of the property they hoped to acquire consisted of vacant, tax-
 
 26. The Answer: What’s The Point of Shared-Equity Homeownership in Weak Market Areas, 
SHELTERFORCE (Apr. 18, 2015) available at http://cltnetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/CLTs-and-
Land-Banks-Article1.pdf. 
 27. Kelly, supra note 3, at 75–77. 
 28. PETER MEDOFF & HOLLY SKLAR, STREETS OF HOPE: THE FALL AND RISE OF AN URBAN 
NEIGHBORHOOD 50–52 (1994) 
 29. Id. at 89–91. 
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delinquent lots resulting from years of fires and demolitions, the resident-lead-
ers of DSNI were resolute that any new housing produced pursuant to their plan 
should be part of Dudley Neighbors, Inc., the CLT they founded to protect per-
manent affordability.30 
To make sure the housing it supported was made permanently affordable 
whenever necessary, the City of Chicago formed its own CLT.  Pursuant to a 
city ordinance adopted in 2009, any housing developed with subsidies dis-
bursed by the City of Chicago will be dedicated to the Chicago Community 
Land Trust (CCLT) if the market value of such housing would exceed by 
$25,000 a price that would be affordable to a moderate-income household.31  
Many of the federal affordable home development subsidies that cities like Chi-
cago handle already provide for some form of affordability protection.  By 
forming the CCLT and adopting this policy, Chicago has declared that proper-
ties developed in areas with high land values will be permanently protected 
from the market. 
DSNI represents an example of a community development effort in a 
neighborhood beset by abandonment that already anticipates displacement with 
the creation of a CLT.  The CCLT offers a model for how cities can ensure the 
properties they control are made permanently affordable when appropriate.  
When faced with the creation of a new public land bank in Philadelphia, neigh-
borhood activists concerned about gentrification demanded that any publicly 
controlled land be used to promote equitable development.32  At first, they in-
sisted that any municipal effort to acquire and dispose of vacant inner-city prop-
erty be used to build up the inventory of a CLT.33  But, as they built their coa-
lition to advocate for public accountability in land banking dispositions, they 
saw that the CLT approach did not reflect the broad range of neighborhood-
based interests that needed to be reflected in the land banking legislation.34  The 
coalition dropped its insistence on a land-bank-to-land-trust pipeline in favor 
of provisions for community accountability in land bank dispositions and a 
more inclusive understanding of beneficial land uses.35 
As neighborhoods emerge from severe distress, the specter of excessively 
high land values will seem, and may well be, remote as compared to other, more 
pressing concerns such as the need to encourage investment even as change is 
monitored for its impact on long-time residents.  CLTs require complex legal 
structures and monitoring infrastructure.36  Resale-restricted homes will have 
 
 30. Id. at 158–59. 
 31. Chicago Community Land Trust for Developers, CITY OF CHICAGO, http://www.cityofchi-
cago.org/city/en/depts/dcd/supp_info/chicago_communitylandtrust.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2015). 
 32. Jill Feldstein, Winning a Land Bank We Can Trust, SHELTERFORCE (Oct. 2, 2014), available at 
http://www.shelterforce.org/article/3910/winning_a_land_bank_we_can_trust2/. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. See Homes Affordable for Good, supra note 15. 
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difficulty competing for buyers with similarly priced unrestricted homes.  The 
heavy hand that CLTs need to use in areas where affordability is scarce or non-
existent will hamper efforts to reconnect emerging neighborhoods to a market 
activity that those neighborhoods still need.  Efforts to reduce transaction costs 
through land banking will suffer if they are feeding directly into systems that 
deliberately impose transaction costs to isolate properties from the market.  But, 
just as reducing transaction costs is not the exclusive province of land banks, 
strategically deploying transaction costs to nudge property use in a socially ben-
eficial direction can be accomplished without the full set of resale restrictions 
associated with CLTs, inclusionary housing and limited-equity cooperatives. 
If “land trusting” is thought of broadly as the imposition of transaction 
costs to retard market actions that diminish social goods, a set of policy choices 
presents itself for preventing displacement without direct control over individ-
ual parcels.  For homeowners, one such fix is readily apparent: targeted prop-
erty tax relief.  Many states, either generally or in specific local jurisdictions, 
provide protection against share increases in property tax rates.37  Some states 
restrict relief to the elderly because many of them depend upon a fixed-income 
and therefore cannot “afford” to have their homes suddenly increase in value.  
Another form of property tax relief caps liability based on income.  All of these 
measures go a long way toward ensuring that homeowners in a gentrifying 
neighborhood are not forced to move by rising property tax costs.  But, they do 
not address the risk of voluntary transfer either by direct sale or by mortgage 
and default.  While restrictions on truly voluntary sales are the domain of formal 
land trusts, low-income homeowners in appreciating markets need protection 
from predatory lenders to come from a wide range of public policy and com-
munity education initiatives. 
Renters, on the other hand, face a double bind when land values rise 
sharply.  Their landlords will see their property tax bills climb.  Nearly all of 
the aforementioned property tax “circuit breakers” are restricted to owner-oc-
cupied properties.  Moreover, increased demand for rental housing in the neigh-
borhood will induce landlords not only to pass on the increased property tax 
costs but also to widen their profit margins at the same time.  Sometimes, this 
will involve expensive upgrades to the building’s common areas or to the hous-
ing units themselves.  Other times, the landlord just raises the rent because he 
or she feels the market will bear it. 
A straightforward approach to the problem would be to award tenants se-
curity of tenure similar to homeowners through full-scale rent regulation.  New 
York City’s Rent Stabilization Code requires landlords of regulated units to 
renew all leases indefinitely with rent increase percentages set by a municipal 
 
 37. The Lincoln Institute of Land Policy offers an online database of such programs.  LINCOLN INST. OF 
LAND POL’Y, Residential Property Tax Relief Programs, available at https://www.lincolninst.edu/sub-
centers/significant-features-property-tax/Report_Residential_Property_Tax_Relief_Programs.aspx (last vis-
ited June 2, 2015). 
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board.38  New York City’s law, however, receives its justification from a leg-
islatively declared housing emergency now in its seventh decade.39  For the 
past thirty years, the District of Columbia has had a comparable rent regulation 
system in which a tenant’s rent increases are tied to overall inflation, but in-
creases between tenancies are based on rents for comparable units.40  The sta-
bility of tenure in the DC system is augmented by another local law that gives 
tenants a right of first refusal in any sale of the building.41  As attractive as these 
approaches are, advocates for tenants might find them difficult to enact espe-
cially in jurisdictions where land values are not uniformly high. 
A more creative and politically palatable approach might be to offer land-
lords tax abatements in return for a lighter version of rent regulation.  Absentee 
owners participating in such a program could have their property taxes capped 
in exchange for a commitment to evict their tenants only for a breach of the 
lease.  For existing tenants of means and new tenants, rental increases could not 
exceed prevailing rates in the neighborhood for comparable units.  For existing 
tenants on fixed or limited incomes, rents would increase pursuant to an index 
similar to the one in the New York City system.  The property tax abatement 
would be greater for those landlords with a higher percentage of regulated rents.  
In this way, tenants in a changing neighborhood could take advantage of a se-
curity of tenure similar to the one enjoyed by homeowners.  Elderly and low-
income tenants could enjoy the same protection against rising land values en-
joyed by their homeowner neighbors. 
Properly understood, land trusting, rather than actual land trusts, might 
serve as a compass for navigating the challenges faced by low- and moderate-
income residents in gentrifying neighborhoods.  As tempting as it is to think 
that direct intervention through stewardship entities such as land banks and land 
trusts are required at all times, the market in an emerging inner-city neighbor-
hood will not crush diversity.  Absent outside influences, there should be a 
spectrum of housing options that need encouragement rather than management. 
 
 
 38. FERN FISHER & ANDREW SCHERER, RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD-TENANT LAW IN NEW YORK § 4.111 
(2014). 
 39. Id. at § 4.5. 
 40. DEP’T. OF HOUS. & CMTY. DEV., What You Should Know about Rent Control in the District of Co-
lumbia, available at http://dhcd.dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/dhcd/publication/attachments/RentControl-
FactSheet.pdf (last visited June 2, 2015). 
 41.  See Julie D. Lawton, Tenant Purchase as a Means of Creating and Preserving Affordable Home-
ownership, 20 GEO. J. POVERTY L. POL’Y 53 (2012). 
